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Abstract 
In a model of imitation it is demonstrated that an economy’s technological develop-
ment is positively correlated with its human capital stock implying that a change in 
education affects the growth rate of GDP both directly through its impact on output 
and indirectly through its impact on the ability to adopt new technologies. In addition 
to human capital, idiosyncratic characteristics determine imitation activity such that 
more education as well as better institutions, a more business-friendly government 
policy and lower technology barriers boost the technological development. The poli-
cies may, however, have very different effects on income per capita in the short and 
medium run and on the technological capacity limit. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The authors thank Susanne Knudsen and Elsebeth Vidø for technical assistance. 
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1.  Introduction 
In a model with focus on imitation of new products with varying productivity levels 
we illustrate that the human capital stock of a country and idiosyncratic characteristics 
combine to determine the maximal attainable productivity level. Countries with iden-
tical human capital stocks may, therefore, follow different growth trajectories depend-
ing on idiosyncratic characteristics that affect the incentives to engage in imitation ac-
tivity. And countries that follow a growth trajectory characterised by a steady state 
with relative low average productivity may do so due to the existence of a low-quality 
labour force or due to the existence of institutions of a low quality, bad governance, 
high technology barriers or other idiosyncratic characteristics.  
 
The framework suggests that policy measures must be carefully chosen to optimise 
growth because catching up with the world technology leader requires both human 
capital and institutions and government policies that provide incentives to engage in 
imitation activity. There is a danger that a country may over-invest in one object in 
the sense that it would stimulate growth more if it were to spread its investments. For 
example, continuous investments in education should preferably go hand in hand with 
improvements in the quality of the country’s institutions, more business-friendly gov-
ernment policies and other characteristics increases the incentives to imitate. 
 
Furthermore, by identifying the channels through which human capital may affect in-
come growth we are able to identify the dynamic effects of a change in education pol-
icy. Our results suggest that the timing of the effects of investments in education may 
be important to take into account. This is because an increase in the human capital 
stock affects the income of countries both directly as a productive input and indirectly 
through its impact on the ability to imitate new products. The only effect that appears 
in the short run is the increase in output from manufacturing due to the input expan-
sion but in the longer run there is also a productivity effect as goods with larger pro-
ductivity are imitated. Moreover, even though there may be positive effects on per-
capita GDP of both an increase in education and a lowering of the costs of imitation 
in the longer run, the two policies may have very different effects on income in the 
short and medium term and on the technological level in the long run. This is because 
the latter policy elicits a reallocation of resources away from manufacturing into imi-
tation activity which impact negatively on income in the short run but in the longer 
run it increases both the per-capita GDP level and the technological level. 
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Our paper complements the literature on the link between human capital, productivity 
and income growth. Nelson and Phelps (1966), Benhabib and Spiegel (1994, 2005) 
and Bils and Klenow (2000) assume a link from human capital to technology such 
that human capital influences productivity growth. Here we demonstrate the existence 
of such a relationship in a model of imitation: a larger human capital stock enables 
entrepreneurs to imitate technologies with higher productivity, thereby increasing the 
average productivity level in the economy. Our framework highlights the dynamic ef-
fects and the complementarity of education policy and policy measures aimed at af-
fecting the incentives to imitate such as institutions and government policy. If a coun-
try manages to increase the human capital stock it will boost income but the develop-
ment possibilities are limited if the incentives to imitate are repressed due to low-
quality-institutions, bad governance or high technology barriers. It is, therefore, im-
portant to develop education facilities, institutions and government policy simultane-
ously. 
  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide some background informa-
tion. Then in section 3 we describe the theoretical framework. In section 4 we explore 
its implications regarding the relationship between human capital, productivity and 
growth in the short and long run. In section 5 we consider policy implications and 
conduct numerical simulations to illustrate the workings of the model further. The last 
section contains concluding remarks. 
2. Background 
In the literature on human capital and economic growth three channels through which 
education may affect growth are identified: 
 
• Education increases the human capital inherent in the labour force which in-
creases labour productivity in manufacturing and, hence, output growth – at 
least temporary (Mankiw et al., 1992; Lucas, 1988); 
 
• Education increases the innovative capacity of the economy and the new 
knowledge, new technologies and/or new products promotes growth (Romer, 
1986, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992, 1998); 
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• Education facilitates the diffusion and transmission of knowledge needed to 
successfully implement new technologies devised by others which promotes 
growth (Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994, 2005). 
 
Growth accounting analyses of the Solow growth model (Solow, 1956) indicates that 
physical capital accumulation can explain only a fraction of the variation in growth 
rates across countries while the rest is attributed to technological progress (Solow, 
1957; Maddison, 1987). Incorporating human capital as an input into the production 
function, Mankiw et al. (1992) find that schooling is a significant determinant of GDP 
per capita and that physical and human capital accumulation and population growth 
explain almost 80 percent of the observed cross-country variation in per-capita in-
come. Recent empirical evidence indicates, however, that the positive relationship be-
tween human capital accumulation and economic growth implied by the framework 
of Mankiw et al. is not robust. Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) find that the growth of 
years of schooling (using human capital stock estimates by Kyriacou, 1991) enters 
negatively and insignificantly in a cross-section of countries. Further, Pritchett (2001) 
reports a negative estimated impact of human capital growth on the growth of GDP 
per worker in less developed countries (using two data sets: Barro and Lee (1993) 
which is based on educational attainment and Nehru et al. (1995) who use the perpet-
ual inventory method to accumulate enrolment rates). Temple (2001) estimates vari-
ous specifications of the link between education and economic growth and concludes 
that2”…the aggregate evidence on education and growth, for large samples of coun-
tries, continues to be clouded with uncertainty.”  
 
An alternative view of the role of human capital is that it affects technological devel-
opment and total factor productivity (TFP). This hypothesis was originally proposed 
by Nelson and Phelps (1966) who suggested that the rate at which the gap between 
the technology frontier and the current level of productivity is closed depends on the 
level of human capital. In technology-based growth models where development of 
new or better products is the ultimate source of growth, human capital is a facilitator 
of technological development. Typically, these models imply that technological de-
velopment is positively related to the stock of human capital in the economy. Many 
cross-country growth regression analyses find a positive correlation between initial 
human capital and subsequent per capita income growth (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 2004). Benhabib and Spiegel (1994, 2005) find a positive role for human 
                                                 
2 Temple (2001) p. 916. 
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capital when the growth rate of total factor productivity is allowed to depend on a na-
tion’s human capital stock. Bils and Klenow (2000) investigate whether the correla-
tion between initial human capital and subsequent income growth works through hu-
man capital accumulation taking into account a possible link from human capital to 
technology. Using calibration techniques they find little evidence of an effect from 
human capital growth on technological development. On the contrary, they find evi-
dence of reverse causality, i.e., that income growth generates human capital accumu-
lation. 
 
One reason why it is difficult to reach consensus regarding the relative importance of 
different mechanisms by which education affect growth may be measurement error in 
cross-country data. Krueger and Lindahl (2001) criticize both the Kyrtiacou (1991) 
and Barro and Lee (1993) data sets because they are based on mismeasured enrolment 
rates and because they contain little information. De la Fuente and Doménech (2001, 
2006) also find that these data sets as well as other sets contain substantial measure-
ment error. They construct a revised set of estimates for 21 OECD countries based on 
an extended set of information on educational attainment in each country and estimate 
a significant schooling coefficient when they use this data set in growth regressions. 
Cohen and Soto (2007) construct a new data set for years of schooling in 95 countries. 
They make use of information on educational attainment by age to build the average 
years of schooling in a country and avoid censuses based on different classification 
systems of education to keep the series consistent for a particular country over time. 
They estimate a significant positive coefficient for schooling in cross-country growth 
regressions based on the Mincerian definition. Hanushek and Kimko (2000), 
Wöβmann (2003) and Hanushek and Wöβmann (2008) criticize the literature on edu-
cation and growth for neglecting qualitative differences in education. They recom-
mend focusing on how much students have learned while in school in stead of count-
ing how long they have sat in school. Empirical evidence suggests a significant posi-
tive effect of the quality of schooling on economic growth using international tests of 
students’ performance in cognitive skills as a proxy for the quality of education. 
  
Another way to progress in our understanding of the effects of human capital on eco-
nomic growth is to more carefully examine the channels through which such effects 
could work. This is what we attempt in this paper. Neither Benhabib and Spiegel nor 
Bils and Klenow formally derive the link from human capital to technology. Rather, 
they assume that there is a link either between the technological development and the 
level of human capital (Benhabib and Spiegel) or between the level of technology and 
the level of human capital (Bils and Klenow). In this paper we set up a framework 
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where human capital has two alternative uses: as an input into the production of out-
put and an input into imitation activity. An increase in the human capital stock, there-
fore, affects the income of countries both directly as a productive input and indirectly 
through its impact on the ability to imitate new products. The only effect that appears 
in the short run is the increase in output from manufacturing due to the input expan-
sion but in the longer run there is also a productivity effect as goods with larger pro-
ductivity are imitated. As in models of innovation-based growth our framework sug-
gests that the allocation of human capital affects the development of technology and 
the growth rate of per capita GDP. But while Romer and others emphasize the link 
between product variety and average productivity, we assume that different products 
are associated with different technological levels and that it requires more human 
capital to imitate and adopt high-technology goods than to imitate and adopt goods of 
a lower technological sophistication. This feature generates a link between the size of 
the human capital stock and countries’ ability to imitate more advanced products and 
gain productivity and income growth.  
 
The idea that different products are associated with different productivity levels has 
been employed in the part of the endogenous growth literature that emphasizes verti-
cal product development (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992, 
1998). Contrary to these models our framework does not assume creative destruction. 
Even though adoption of new products with higher productivity decreases the demand 
for existing products they do not drive out existing products from the market.  
 
Other recent attempts to model the channels through which human capital may affect 
economic growth include Vandenbussche et al. (2006) and Ciccone and Papaioannou 
(forthcoming). Assuming that technological progress is the result of both imitation 
and innovation, Vandenbussche et al. demonstrate that human capital may play a dif-
ferent role at different stages of development. Because the tasks of imitation and in-
novation requires different types of human capital the growth-enhancing impact of 
skilled human capital (holding the total level of human capital constant) increases 
with a country’s proximity to the frontier, while the growth-enhancing impact of un-
skilled labour decreases with the proximity to the frontier. For a sample of 19 OECD 
countries they find evidence that skilled human capital significantly matters for tech-
nological progress while unskilled human capital contributes little to technological 
improvement. 
  
Ciccone and Papaioannou combine the idea of different types of human capital with 
an assumption of different efficiency growth of the two types of human capital (in-
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creasing in the gap between country efficiency and world frontier efficiency as in 
Nelson and Phelps and Benhabib and Spiegel). Assuming the existence of two indus-
tries that differ in terms of their skill intensity, Ciccone and Papaioannou demonstrate 
that an increase in human capital may affect the relative production differently 
through the input effect and the technology adoption effect. They also show that an 
increase in the efficiency growth of high human capital at the world frontier implies 
that countries that are relatively abundant in human capital increases their relative 
production of the skill intensive good compared to countries with less human capital. 
Empirically the authors find that countries with higher initial levels of schooling ex-
periences faster growth in more compared to less schooling-intensive industries in the 
1980’s and 1990’s where new technologies are thought to be more skilled-labour 
augmenting than the technologies of the 1950’s and 1960’s.  
 
Our emphasis on the interplay between human capital and idiosyncratic characteris-
tics such as institutions derives from the part of the growth literature that debates the 
fundamental causes of growth. Hall and Jones (1999) find that differences in institu-
tions and government policies account for much of the difference in capital intensity, 
human capital per worker, productivity and, hence, output per worker across coun-
tries. Acemoglu et al. (2001) confirm this result using differences in European mortal-
ity rates at the time of colonization as instrument for current institutions. They, there-
fore, conclude that institutions that provide the incentives for individuals and firms to 
invest in human and physical capital are the fundamental sources of growth. Glaeser 
et al. (2004) claim, however, that European mortality rates are more highly correlated 
with human capital than with current institutions, thereby questioning the validity of 
the instrument. Using different measures of institutions they find that human capital is 
the most important fundamental source of growth. Glaeser et al. (2007) develop a 
framework where education encourages democracy because it raises the benefits of 
political participation. Baten and van Zanden (forthcoming) show that human capital 
formation measured by book production per capita and growth enhancing institutions 
both had a strong positive effect on economic performance in the centuries before 
1800. 
3. Theoretical framework  
The model focuses on imitation of new goods as the engine of technological devel-
opment where the goods are associated with different productivity levels. The inven-
tion of new goods takes place abroad and is not modelled. Hence, we consider a 
group of developing countries who imitate goods invented in technologically more 
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advanced countries. These countries do not invent new goods themselves but they 
may devote resources to the task of imitation in order to copy and adapt goods in-
vented abroad. 
  
At time t there exist  differentiated goods in the world. Each good is identified 
by a certain productivity level 
)(tN
θ , representing the units of output generated by a 
given amount of inputs. Goods are aligned on a continuum such that higher-ranked 
goods entail higher productivity. The productivity level grows at a constant rate  
per good implying that good i is associated with a productivity level of 
 where 
θg
igei θθθ )0()( = )0(θ  is predetermined.  
 
Consider developing country j. The range of goods that this economy is capable of 
copying and adapting in period t is given by a continuous interval between 0 and 
),( jtn .  The maximum level of sophistication ),( jtn  is determined by a country-
specific imitation parameter and the stock of human capital in the economy. The 
range of goods that the economy produces at time  belongs to *t [ ]),(,0 jtn  where 
)(),(),( tNjtnjtn <≤ . Each of these goods is associated with a unique productiv-
ity level. Hence,  is the number of goods that is produced at time t and ),( jtn
)),(( jtnθ  is the productivity level of the most productive good at time t: 
 
  n(t,j) 
 
Henceforth we consider a single developing country. Therefore we drop the country 
index. 
 
Households 
The economy consists of a number of identical infinitely lived households. The repre-
sentative household maximizes utility over an infinite horizon subject to an intertem-
poral budget constraint. Households like diversity in consumption and we adopt the 
Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) specification which implies a constant and equal rate of substitu-
tion between every pair of goods.  
 
0   N(t) 
( )tMθ  
  ( , )n t j  
( ( , ))n t jθ )),(( jtnθ      ( ( ))N tθ  
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∫ ∫∞ −−
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
t
tn
t ddjjxetU ττ αατρ
1
)(
0
)( ),(log)(  
where 0>ρ  is the constant subjective discount rate,  is consumption of good 
no. i at time t,  is the number of differentiated goods available for consumption 
at time t and 
),( itx
)(tn
εεα /)1( −≡  where 1>ε  is the elasticity of substitution between 
any pair of goods. 
 
Households are endowed with an exogenous stock of human capital and income is 
generated through the supply of human capital and returns to its financial wealth. 
Households can freely borrow and lend at the instantaneous interest rate r(t). These 
assumptions imply the following budget constraint: 
 
)()()()()()( tBtrtHtwtBtE +=+ •     
where  is the household’s nominal spending in period t,  is the financial 
wealth,  is the wage rate per unit human capital, and is the stock of human 
capital. 
)(tE
)(tw
)(tB
)(tH
 
Solving the representative households’ problem implies the following first order con-
ditions: 
 
(1)  ( )( , ) ( , )
( )
E t
x t i p t i
P t
ε−=    
(2)  ( ) ( )
( )
E t
r t
E t
ρ
•
= −   
 
where equation (1) determines the demand for each type of good and (2) is the 
Keynes-Ramsey rule.  is the price of good i and  ),( itp
)(tn 
∫ −≡
0
1),()( djjtptP ε  is a price index. 
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We apply the normalization suggested by Grossman and Helpman (1991) that house-
holds’ nominal spending is normalized to one in each period of time. Then equation 
(1) is rewritten as 
 
(1’)  1( , ) ( , )
( )
x t i p t i
P t
ε−=  
and equation (2) implies that the interest rate equals the discount rate: 
 
(2’)  ( )r t ρ= . 
 
Goods production 
In order to focus on the interaction between human capital and the production struc-
ture in determining income, the production technology is as simple as possible. The 
only input is human capital and there is constant returns to scale. Hence, the technol-
ogy for producing good i is 
 
(3)  ),()(),( ithiitx θ=   for all [ ])(;0 tni∈  
 
where )(iθ  is the productivity level associated with good i and is the amount 
of human capital used to produce good i in period t.
),( ith
3 
 
There is monopolistic competition in the goods market implying that the price is a 
mark-up over marginal costs: 
 
(4)  1 ( )( , )
( )
w t
p t i
iα θ=  for all [ ]0; ( )i n t∈ . 
Demand for human capital to produce good i is determined by profit maximization as 
 
(5)  
1 1
( )
1
0
( ) 1 ( )
( , )
( ) ( ) ( ( )) (0)
( )
n t
i i
h t i
w t w t n t
j dj
ε ε
ε ε
ε
α θ ε θ
θ θθ
− −
−
−= = −∫
 for all [ ]0; ( )i n t∈ .  
                                                 
3 Decreasing returns to scale does not change the results qualitatively.  
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The more different types of goods that the economy produces, the less human capital 
is available for production of each good, and the smaller is the scale of production of 
each good given productivity. But given the number of different types of goods that is 
produced in the economy, more human capital is devoted to production of more so-
phisticated goods than to less sophisticated goods. Hence, at any point in time the 
scale of production increases with the productivity level due to the constant elasticity 
of substitution in demand. 
 
The above price rule and human capital demand imply the following instantaneous 
profit from production of good i: 
 
(6) 
 1 1
( )
1
0
1 1 ( ) ( )
( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )
( ( )) (0)
( )
( , ) n t
i i
p t i x t i w t h t i w t h t i
n t
j dj
t i
ε ε
ε ε
ε
α θ θ
α ε θθ
π
− −
−
−= − = = = −
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ∫ θ for all [ ]0; ( )i n t∈ . 
 
 
Entrepreneurs 
Entrepreneurs may copy and adapt goods invented abroad by allocating human capital 
to the task of imitation, and there exists an externality effect from imitation activity 
because each new good adds to the domestic public stock of knowledge. Specifically, 
it takes  units of human capital to imitate good i at time t. 
The parameter A>0 reflects idiosyncratic characteristics that affect the costs of imita-
tion equally across imitation projects. The larger is A the more resources are needed 
to imitate any good. The idiosyncratic characteristics include the national technologi-
cal level and efficiency in imitation, economic institutions, government policies and 
the extent of barriers to technology adoption. Acemoglu (forthcoming) defines eco-
nomic institutions as the structure of property rights, the presence and functioning of 
markets and the contractual opportunities available to individuals and firms. All these 
characteristics may affect the amount of investment an entrepreneur must make to 
adopt a new technology. Hall and Jones (1999) use a broader concept, social infra-
structure, which they define as institutions and government policies that determine the 
economic environment. Government policies that may affect the value of A include 
business registration fees and other establishment costs. What Parente and Prescott 
(1994) label technology barriers may also affect the costs of imitation. As examples 
of barriers, Parente and Prescott mention regulatory and legal constraints, bribes that 
must be paid, violence or threat of violence, outright sabotage, and worker strikes.  
)(/)(),( 1 tniAita −= εθ
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The amount of resources needed to imitate a good is positively correlated with the 
level of productivity that the good entails reflecting the idea that goods are aligned on 
a continuum where higher-ranked goods are more sophisticated and, therefore, more 
costly to imitate. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) treat the cost of imitation as a func-
tion of the difference between the number of goods that has been imitated domesti-
cally and the number of goods that has been invented worldwide, and they assume 
that the larger is this difference the smaller are the costs of imitation. The argument 
could be that it is relatively easier to copy a good when the number of potential tar-
gets is larger. Here, the appearance of )(iθ  in the imitation costs function implies the 
same relationship at a given point in time. It requires fewer resources to imitate goods 
that are less sophisticated and, therefore, far away from the world technology frontier 
than to imitate goods that are closer to the frontier.  
 
We also include a knowledge spillover in imitation reflecting that an imitator cannot 
appropriate all of the potential benefits from his or her imitation effort. In this case, 
there exists a public knowledge stock that represents a collection of ideas and meth-
ods that is useful to later generations of imitators. The size of the knowledge external-
ity at any point in time is measured by the number of differentiated goods that has 
been imitated until that point in time. Due to this externality effect the model predicts 
that the amount of resources needed to imitate a certain good decreases over time. 
 
Entrepreneurs can freely enter into the activity of imitation and decide how many 
goods to copy on the continuous interval between 0 and )(tn . Let ),( itν  be the value 
of good i. Then value maximization implies that 
 
(7)  )(),(),( twitait =ν  for all goods that are imitated in period t. 
 
Once a firm masters the technology that applies to good i domestic property rights en-
sure that it earns an infinite stream of profits from goods production implying the fol-
lowing value of imitating good i: 
(8)  . 
( )
( , ) ( , )
s
t
r d
t
t i e s i ds
τ τ
ν π
∞ −∫= ∫
Equation (7) and (8) imply the following no-arbitrage condition which determines a 
relationship between the cost of imitating a good in period t and the present value 
from production of that good in future periods: 
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(9)  
1 ( )( ) ( )
( , )
( )
s
t
r d
t
A i w t
e s i
n t
ε τ τθ π
∞− −∫= ∫ ds  
where we have used that . )(/)(),( 1 tniAita −= εθ
 
Human capital 
The total stock of human capital in the economy is determined by the size of the la-
bour force and the education level of the workers:  
 
)()()( tSetLtH ψ=  
where L(t) is the number of workers at time t, S(t) is their average years of schooling 
and 0>ψ  is a constant that measures the private returns to schooling. This specifi-
cation implies that an extra year of an individual’s schooling raises the individual’s 
human capital stock in the same proportion regardless of the level of schooling. With 
atomistic workers it is also the case that an extra year of an individual’s schooling has 
the same proportional effect on earnings regardless of the level of schooling – a fea-
ture that is also present in Mincerian earnings regressions.  
 
We assume that the average years of schooling is determined by government policy 
and that it is constant over time, ( )S t S= . Further, we assume that the size of the 
work force is constant over time, ( ) .L t L=   
 
Equilibrium in the market for human capital implies that the total stock of human 
capital is allocated between goods production and imitation. From (5) the demand for 
human capital for manufacturing is 
 
( )
0
( )
( ) ( , )
( )
n t n t
n t h t j dj
w t
α=∫ . 
 
The amount of human capital devoted to imitation in period t is the time derivative of 
the total amount of human capital allocated to imitation activity until time t which is 
 
( )( ) ( ) 1
0 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( )) (0)
n t n t A
n t a j dj A j dj n tε ε εθ θ θε
−= = −∫ ∫  
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The time derivative of this expression is 
( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( )( ( )) (0) ( ( ))
( ) ( ( )) ( )
d A n t n t n t
n t A n t
dt n t n t n t
ε ε ε θθ θ θε θ
•∂− = ∂
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ .   
The demand for human capital for imitation depends on idiosyncratic features, the 
elasticity of substitution of the productivity level with respect to the number of goods  
 
( ( )) ( )
( ) ( ( ))
n t n t
n t n t
θ
θ
∂
∂
⎛⎜ ⎞⎟⎝ ⎠ 
, and the number of goods that is imitated.  
 
Now the condition for equilibrium in the market for human capital becomes: 
(10)   ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( )( ( )) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( )
Sn t n t n t n tA n t H t Le
w t n t n t n t
ε ψθα θ θ
•∂+ =∂ =  
4. Steady state and transitional dynamics 
Solving the model delivers a difference equation governing the development of n (see 
appendix): 
(11)  
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
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⎣
⎡
−+−
−−= −
+
−
•
11
1
)0(
)0(
1)( **
)(
)(
ng
t
ctng
t
S
tng
e
e
e
e
L
A
e
eg
L
A
tn
θθ
θ
ε
ρ
ε
ρ
ε
ψ
ε
θ
ε
αρθ
θ
 
where we have used that .  denote the point in time when the 
economy reaches long-run steady state and 
igei θθθ )0()( = *t
)),(()(t + ntnc ∈n  where n  is the tech-
nological capacity limit (for proof of existence and uniqueness of a solution see the 
appendix). This difference equation determines the development of the number of 
goods that is imitated and, therefore, the development of productivity over time given 
the human capital stock, idiosyncratic characteristics and preference parameters.  
 
From (11) the technological capacity limit is determined as 
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Increases in the average years of schooling, S, and the imitation parameter, A, both 
have positive and negative effects on the incentives to imitate new goods and, hence, 
on the technological development. Longer average schooling implies a larger human 
capital stock which elicits a lower wage rate so that the costs of imitation decrease 
and imitation activity increases. On the other hand, a larger human capital stock en-
hances the capacity limit of the economy so that the value of an imitation project de-
creases because instantaneous profit decreases as the number of goods expands. The 
positive effect dominates such that a larger human capital stock accelerates imitation 
activity. Likewise, an increase in imitation costs, A, has a negative effect on the imita-
tion activity but it also lowers the capacity limit of the economy so that the value of 
an imitation project increases. Here, the negative effect dominates such that a larger 
value of the imitation parameter is associated with less imitation activity. Since the 
productivity level of the economy is a continuous positive function of the number of 
goods that is imitated ( ) there is a positive relation between the av-
erage human capital stock per worker and the steady state productivity level, and a 
negative relationship between the imitation parameter and the steady state productiv-
ity level. 
)())(( tngetn θθ =
 
Integrating the manufacturing technology (equation 3) over all goods, substituting the 
human capital demand from equation 5 and imposing the condition for equilibrium in 
the market for human capital (equation 10), GDP per worker is determined as 
 
(13)   where ( ) ( ) ( )y t t t= Ω Θ
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t e g e n t
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g n t
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θ
θ
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ε θε
+ −Θ ≡ + −
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . 
)(tΩ  is human capital per worker used in manufacturing while )(tΘ  is a productiv-
ity index reflecting that imitation of new goods generates an increase in the productiv-
ity level because new goods are more productive than existing ones. The larger is the 
productivity index and the more human capital per worker is devoted to manufactur-
ing, the larger is GDP per worker.  
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The capacity limit in (12) implies the following level of GDP per worker in steady 
state: 
(14)  y
− −= ΩΘ  where 
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⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . 
An increase in the average years of schooling implies that there are more human capi-
tal available for manufacturing ( )(tΩ  increases). Therefore, GDP per worker in-
creases in the short run. There is also more human capital available for imitation so in 
the longer run the larger imitation activity generates an increase in the average pro-
ductivity level ( )(tΘ  increases) which also affects GDP per worker positively. An 
increase in the costs of imitation has both a positive and a negative effect on GDP per 
worker in the short run. First, for a given imitation activity more resources are needed 
to imitate new goods so human capital available for manufacturing decreases (  
decreases given n(t) and ). Second, as it becomes less profitable to imitate, a re-
allocation of resources away from imitation towards manufacturing takes place 
(  increases). The positive effect dominates such that GDP per worker increases. 
In the longer run the lower imitation activity affects average productivity negatively 
(  decreases) implying a negative relationship between the imitation parameter 
and GDP per worker in the long run.   
)(tΩ
)(tn
•
)(tΩ
)(tΘ
 
The second derivative of the steady state level of sophistication wrt. human capital 
per worker is negative but the second derivative of steady-state-GDP per worker wrt. 
human capital is positive. Even though there is constant returns to human capital in 
the manufacturing technology the fact that more human capital elicits more imitation 
activity and, therefore, productivity growth implies that the economy uses, on aver-
age, a lower and lower amount of human capital to manufacture one unit of output.4 
 
                                                 
4 Increasing returns to human capital is a feature that is present in many endogenous growth models, 
e.g., Romer (1990) and several of the frameworks in Grossman and Helpman (1991). In our frame-
work it is possible to obtain diminishing returns to human capital if we interpret 
1
( )
0
( , )
n t
x j dj
αατ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫  as a final goods technology and assume diminishing returns to scale in the fi-
nal goods sector at any moment in time. 
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While an extra year of schooling has the same proportional effect on earnings regard-
less of the level of schooling for an individual, the proportional effect of an extra year 
of average schooling for the economy as a whole depends on the human capital stock 
in society. The larger is the human capital stock per worker the lower is the semielas-
ticity of GDP per worker wrt. average years of schooling. In a standard Solow model 
with a Cobb-Douglas production technology and  the semielasticity of GDP 
per worker wrt. average years of schooling does not depend on the current level of 
schooling. Bils and Klenow (2000) and Hall and Jones (1999) specify non-linear 
functional forms in the exponential function in order to generate dependency between 
the semielasticity and the current level of schooling. We obtain the result by including 
productivity differentials across goods implying that average productivity depends on 
the level of schooling because the maximal attainable level of technological sophisti-
cation does. 
Seh ψ=
  
The model is consistent with conditional convergence implying that countries with 
identical human capital stocks and country-specific characteristics converge towards 
the same level of income per worker in the long run given by y . Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1997) were the first to point to the existence of conditional convergence in a 
model of imitation. In their model the costs of imitation is relatively lower than the 
costs of inventing new products. Imitating countries, therefore, tend to grow faster 
than countries that perform research and development (for given government policies 
and other variables that affect the return from introduction of new products). But as 
the pool of copiable material decreases, the costs of imitation rises and the growth 
rate of the imitating country decreases. The costs of imitation, therefore, represent a 
form of diminishing returns to imitation that is analogous to the diminishing returns to 
capital accumulation in the neoclassical theory of exogenous technological progress. 
Here, the growth rate of GDP per worker decreases as the number of differentiated 
goods increases since more goods lowers the expected profit from imitation activity 
which slows down the technological development and, thereby, income growth. 
5. Numerical simulations 
To illustrate further the workings of the model we perform numerical simulations. We 
assume that (i) the economy is initially far away from steady state implying that 
t*>>t (specifically, we assume that t=0 and ), and (ii) 1000* =t )( ctn +  is a simple 
average of n(t) and n . Then the share of human capital employed in imitation is ap-
proximately  
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To determine the values of the parameters we assume that (i) the number of different 
types of goods produced in the economy initially is 200, (ii) the returns to education is 
10%, i.e., 1.0=ψ  and (iii) the average years of schooling is 4. By setting 
58.0=α , %8=ρ , %01,0=θg  and 100)0( =θ  we obtain a share of human 
capital used in imitation of 49.3% and a fixed costs of imitation per worker of 0,11%. 
 
Example 1 
This example illustrates that two countries with identical human capital stocks may 
follow different growth paths due to idiosyncratic characteristics. Hence, we consider 
two countries with identical human capital stocks and initial average productivity lev-
els but the fixed costs of imitation in country 2 are twice the costs in country 1. This 
difference may be due to lower efficiency, lower quality of institutions, a less busi-
ness-friendly policy or larger technology barriers in country 2.  
 
Figur 1 shows that the capacity limit of country 1 is almost twice that of country 2. n  
is 1726 in country 1 whereas it is only 951 in country 2. It also illustrates that the an-
nual growth rate of productivity in country 1 exceeds the growth rate in country 2 
during the transition since, initially, country 1 is much further away from its capacity 
limit than country 2 is. The level of GDP per worker is, however, higher in country 2 
than it is in country 1 during the first years, cf. figure 2. The reason for this is that, 
initially, the countries experience the same average productivity in manufacturing but, 
due to the large costs of imitation in country 2, the productivity of human capital in 
imitation is relatively low in country 2 compared to country 1. Therefore, country 2 
devotes fewer resources to imitation activity implying that more resources are avail-
able for manufacturing. In the short run this shows up as a positive effect on GDP per 
worker but as the productivity level of country 1 expands compared to country 2, 
GDP per worker in country 1 exceeds that in country 2 after 12 years.  
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Figure 1. Level of sophistication and capacity limit – example 1 
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Figure 2. GDP per worker – example 1 
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The example illustrates that countries may follow different development paths of in-
come per worker even if the countries are endowed with the same human capital stock 
due to differences in efficiency, institutions, government policies or technology barri-
ers. The difference may also be interpreted as a cost discovery differential as sug-
gested by Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) and Hausmann et al. (2007). Their idea is that 
in order to start production of a good for the first time in a developing country an en-
trepreneur needs to explore the underlying cost structure of the economy. This cost 
discovery process requires investment of a certain number of units of labour which 
may be related to our assumption that it takes  units of human capital 
to imitate good i at time t.
)(/)( 1 tniA −εθ
5 By constructing a measure of the productivity level asso-
ciated with countries’ specialization patterns, Hausmann et al. find that China (among 
others) is an outlier in the sense that China’s productivity level is much higher than 
the productivity levels of other countries with approximately the same level of income 
per capita. Rodrik (forthcoming) suggests that one of the reasons for China’s sophisti-
cated export basket is a determined government effort to acquire domestic capabilities 
and build modern industry. In our model it would imply that the imitation parameter 
in China is lower than in other countries with a similar endowment of human capital. 
 
Example 2 
The second example illustrates the dynamic effects of an increase in the human capi-
tal stock and a decrease in the fixed costs of imitation, respectively. In particular, it il-
lustrates that even though the two policies may generate the same long-run develop-
ment of income per capita, the effects in the short and medium term may differ. We 
consider a country that manages to increase the average number of years of schooling 
from 4 to 5 years. For simplicity we assume that it happens during a single period of 
time. This 25% increase in the average years of schooling causes the human capital 
stock to expand by 10.5%. Therefore, the capacity limit of the economy goes up from 
n =1726 to n =1873. With a larger human capital stock it is possible to spend more 
resources on imitation activity and on manufacturing. Therefore, GDP per worker in-
creases from the outset with 5.5%. As the effect on average productivity shows up, 
GDP per worker expands further. After 10 years GDP per worker is 8.3% higher than 
before the policy change, and in the long run GDP increases by 11.5 %, cf. figure 3.  
 
 
                                                 
5 Hausmann et al. (2005) incorporates uncertainty such that entrepreneurs do not know ex ante the 
productivity level associated with the good that they become able to produce after cost discovery 
has taken place. 
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Figure 3. GDP per worker – example 2 
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Now, assume that the country chooses to expand its long-run GDP per worker by the 
same amount by increasing the quality of its institutions or implementing a more 
business-friendly policy in stead of increasing the average years of schooling. That is, 
we target the level of GDP per worker in the long run to be the same as in figure 3 
and calculate the required change in the imitation paramater to be a decrease of 
60.4%. This policy generates short and medium run dynamics which are very differ-
ent from above, cf. figure 4. GDP per worker immediately drops by 31.9%, after 10 
years it is 10.2% lower than it would have been without the policy change, and it 
takes 21 years before the policy change generates a positive effect on GDP per capita. 
The reason for this result is that the returns from investment of an extra unit of human 
capital in imitation increases dramatically when the imitation parameter decreases 
60%. Therefore, the share of human capital employed in imitation increases from 
around 8% to 37% and less resources are available for manufacturing. The cut in the 
costs of imitation also slows down the convergence towards steady state compared to 
the increase in the human capital stock. 50 years after the policy changes GDP per 
worker is 99.2% of the steady state level when the human capital stock increases 
while it is only 97.7% of the steady state level when the costs of imitation decreases.  
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Figure 4. GDP per worker – example 2 
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In conclusion, if the government wishes to increase steady state income per worker 
and it takes into account the transitional effects then an expansion of the human capi-
tal stock is preferable compared to an improvement in its institutions or a more busi-
ness-friendly policy. But if we consider the technological implications then a reduc-
tion in the costs of imitation are preferable to an expansion of the human capital 
stock. This is because a costs reduction expands the capacity limit of the economy 
much more than an expansion of the human capital stock does. When the costs of imi-
tation decreases by 60.4% then the number of different types of goods that the econ-
omy is capable of producing in the long run doubles. In comparison, one additional 
average year of schooling only expands the capacity limit by 8.5%. To understand 
this result look at the effect of the two policies on the human capital split between 
manufacturing and imitation (figure 5). When the human capital stock increases it af-
fects both manufacturing and imitation because both activities use human capital. But 
due to the spillover effect in imitation a modest reallocation of human capital away 
from manufacturing into imitation takes place. When the costs of imitation decrease 
then the demand for human capital for imitation increases but, initially, there is no 
change in the demand for human capital for manufacturing. This elicits a huge reallo-
cation of resources away from manufacturing into imitation implying that the econ-
omy becomes much more sophisticated when the fixed costs decrease than when the 
human capital stock expands.  
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Figure 5. Share of human capital used in imitation – example 2 
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Papaioannou and Siourounis (forthcoming) demonstrate a J-shaped growth pattern 
following democratization where annual output growth in democratization countries 
drops significantly during the transition but stabilizes at a higher level in the longer 
run. Here, the same holds for the dynamic effects of an improvement in institutions or 
a more business-friendly policy. But while Papaioannou and Siourounis explain the 
initial negative effect of democratization with the observation that democratizations 
tend to occur during recessions, the initial drop in GDP per worker in our framework 
happens as a consequence of a change in the relative costs of imitation compared to 
manufacturing which affects the incentives to imitate. 
 
 
Example 3 
The last example illustrates the complementarity of human capital and imitation costs 
and the importance of affecting both to obtain maximal effect on income. Consider an 
economy where the policymakers implement an education policy that increases aver-
age human capital per worker by 0.1 unit (equivalent to an increase in average time 
spent on education of 0.65 years per worker). The larger human capital stock affects 
GDP per worker positively because more human capital is available for manufactur-
ing. In the longer run the initial positive effect is supplemented by a positive produc-
tivity effect as more human capital is used in imitation which speeds up the techno-
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logical development. As a consequence GDP per worker increases by 7.3% and the 
number of different types of goods available increases by 5.4% in the long run. 
 
If, however, imitation costs per worker are lower than human capital per worker then 
a more effective income generating policy is to substitute part of the human capital 
increase with an improvement in the quality of institutions. Figure 6 illustrates the 
case. In stead of limiting the policy focus to education, a mix of education and institu-
tional policies has a larger impact on income. By lowering the costs of imitation by 
0.0005 units per worker at the cost of only increasing human capital by 0.0995 units 
per worker, GDP per worker increases by 14.6% (compared to 6.7% when only hu-
man capital is affected). The reason for this result is that the limitation imposed by ei-
ther of the constraints is relaxed such that the economy is better able to extract the 
positive effect of either of the policy changes.  
 
Figure 6. GDP per worker – example 3 
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The above example illustrates the complementarity between human capital accumula-
tion and institutional improvements. A country can develop technologically through 
ongoing human capital accumulation but if the quality of institutions is not improved 
then the bad quality limits the technological development possibilities. Likewise, a 
country can improve the quality of its institutions, thereby increasing the incentives to 
engage in imitation activity, but if the human capital stock is not increased then the 
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low stock puts an upper limit to the technological development. It is vital for optimal 
economic development to improve both education facilities and institutions.  
6. Conclusions 
We have developed a framework that incorporates the idea that goods are associated 
with different productivity levels and we have analysed the implications in the short 
and long run. The model is consistent with conditional convergence and the growth 
path of en economy depends on the size of the human capital stock and idiosyncratic 
characteristics that affect the costs of imitation. Countries with identical human capi-
tal stocks may, therefore, converge towards different long-run levels of income per 
worker due to idiosyncratic characteristics.  
 
An increase in the average education level and a decrease in the costs of imitation af-
fect the technological development and the level of GDP per worker in the long run 
positively. It is, therefore, possible to change the development path of income per 
worker both through policies designed to affect the average education level and 
through policies designed to affect agents’ incentives to engage in imitation activity. 
Nevertheless, the two policies may have very different effects on income per worker 
in the short and medium term and on the technological capacity limit.  
 
Our framework implies that GDP per worker is the product of human capital per 
worker allocated to manufacturing times a productivity index. Both variables depend 
on the average level of education in the economy and the fixed costs of imitating. 
Hence, changes in the education level affect the development path of the economy 
both through its effect on the resources available for production and through its effect 
on the productivity index. This feature has implication for empirical growth analyses. 
Often growth empirics start from a Cobb-Douglas production technology with labour, 
human capital and physical capital. Then the growth rate of GDP per worker is a lin-
ear function of population growth, human capital growth, physical capital growth and 
productivity growth. Our analysis suggests that it is important to take account of the 
effect that changes in average education has both on the human capital accumulation 
and the productivity growth. By excluding the latter effect the analysis underestimates 
the effect of education on per-worker-GDP growth. This feature of the model may 
contribute to explain the low and often insignificant estimate found when regressing 
growth in income per capita on human capital accumulation. 
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Our model could be extended in several dimensions. First, the innovation of new 
goods takes place abroad and we do not model the innovation activity. In reality, a 
combination of imitation and innovation drives total factor productivity. A further 
step could, therefore, be to study the interaction between human capital and idiosyn-
cratic characteristics when both activities are modelled explicitly. Second, our nu-
merical examples illustrate the existence of different dynamic effects of education 
policies and policies designed to affect imitation activity. Including some lags in the 
human capital accumulation process would ensure more rigorous dynamic effects. 
Third, international trade considerations would make it possible to study the dynamic 
interaction between human capital and idiosyncratic characteristics in the context of 
international specialization.  
28    FOI    Human capital, technological progress and growth 
References 
Acemoglu D. (forthcoming) Introduction to modern economic growth. 
 
Acemoglu D., Johnson S. and Robinson J.A. (2001) “The colonial origins of com-
parative development: an empirical investigation” The American Economic Re-
view 91, 5: 1369-1401. 
 
Aghion P. and Howitt P. (1992) “A model of growth through creative destruction” 
Econometrics 60: 323-351. 
 
Aghion P. and Howitt P. (1998) Endogenous growth theory. Cambridge, USA. MIT 
Press. 
 
Barro R.J. and  Lee J. (1993) “International comparisons of educational attainment.” 
Journal of Monetary Economics 32, 3: 363-394. 
 
Barro R.J. and Sala-i-Martin X. (2004) Economic growth. Second ed. Cambridge, 
USA. MIT Press.  
 
Barro R.J. and Sala-i-Martin X. (1997) “Technological diffusion, convergence, and 
growth” Journal of Economic Growth 2, 1: 1-27. 
 
Baten J. and van Zanden J. (forthcoming) “Book production and the onset of modern 
economic growth” Journal of Economic Growth.  
 
Benhabib J. and Spiegel M.M. (1994) ”The role of human capital in economic devel-
opment: Evidence from cross-country data” Journal of Monetary Economics 34: 
143-173. 
 
Benhabib, J. and Spiegel M.M. (2005) “Human capital and technology diffusion” in 
Aghion P. and Durlauf S.N. (eds.) Handbook of economic growth. Amsterdam. 
North-Holland. 
 
Bils M. and Klenow P.J. (2000) “Does schooling cause growth?” The American Eco-
nomic Review 90, 5: 1160-1183. 
 
Human capital, technological progress and growth  FOI    29 
Ciccone A. and Papaioannou E. (forthcoming) “Human capital, the structure of pro-
duction, and economic growth” Review of Economics and Statistics. 
 
Cohen, D. and Soto, M. (2007) “Growth and human capital: good data, good results” 
Journal of Economic Growth 12, 1: 51-76.  
 
De la Fuente A. and Doménech R. (2001) “Schooling data, technological diffusion, 
and the neoclassical model” American Economic Review 91, 2: 323-327. 
 
De la Fuente A. and Doménech R. (2006) “Human capital in growth regressions: 
How much difference does data quality make?” Journal of the European Eco-
nomic Association 4, 1: 1-36. 
 
Dixit A. and Stiglitz J.E. (1977) “Monopolistic competition and optimum product di-
versity” American Economic Review 67, 3: 297-308. 
 
Glaeser E.L., La Porta R., Lopez-de-Silanes F. and Shleifer A. (2004) “Do institutions 
cause growth?” Journal of Economic Growth 9, 3: 271-303. 
 
Glaeser E.L., Ponzetto G.A.M. and Shleifer A. (2007) “Why does democracy need 
education? Journal of Economic Growth 12, 2: 77-99. 
 
Grosman G.M. and Helpman E. (1991) Innovation and growth in the global economy 
Cambridge, USA. MIT Press. 
 
Hall R.E. and Jones C.I. (1999) “Why do some countries produce so much more out-
put per worker than others?” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 1: 83-
116. 
 
Hanushek E.A. and Kimko D.D. (2000) “Schooling, labor force quality, and the 
growth of nations.” American Economic Review 90, 5: 1184-1208. 
 
Hanushek E.A. and Wössmann L. (2008) “The role of cognitive skills in economic 
development” Journal of Economic Literature 46, 3. 
 
Hausmann R., Hwang J. and Rodrik D. (2007) “What you export matters” Journal of 
Economic Growth 12, 1: 1-25. 
 
30    FOI    Human capital, technological progress and growth 
Hausmann R. and Rodrik D. (2003) “Economic discovery as self discovery” Journal 
of Development Economics, 72, 2: 603-633.  
 
Krueger A.B. and Lindahl M. (2001) “Education for growth: Why and for whom?” 
Journal of Economic Literature 39, 4: 1101-1136. 
 
Kyriacou G. (1991) “Level and growth effects of human capital” Working paper 91-
26. C.V. Starr Center, New York. 
 
Lucas R.E. (1988) “On the mechanisms of economic development” Journal of Mone-
tary Economics 22: 3-42. 
 
Maddison A. (1987) “Growth and slowdown in advanced capitalist economies” Jour-
nal of Economic Literature 25: 649-698. 
 
Mankiw N.G., Romer D. and Weil D.N. (1992) “A contribution to the empirics of 
economic growth” Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, 2: 407-437. 
 
Nehru V. Swanson E. and Dubey A. (1995) “A new database on human capital stock 
in developing and industrial countries: Sources, methodology and results” Jour-
nal of Development Economics 46, 2: 379-401. 
 
Nelson R.R. and Phelps E.S. (1966) “Investment in humans, technologicl diffusion 
and economic growth” American Economic Review 56: 69-75. 
 
Papaioannou E. and Siourounis G. (forthcoming) “Democratization and growth” Eco-
nomic Journal. 
 
Parente S.L. and Prescott E.C. (1994) “Barriers to technology adoption and develop-
ment” Journal of Political Economy 102, 2: 298-321. 
 
Pritchett L. (2001) “Where has all the education gone?” The World Bank Economic 
Review 15, 3: 367-391.  
 
Rodrik D. (forthcoming) “What’s so special about Chinas exports” China & World 
Economy. 
 
Human capital, technological progress and growth  FOI    31 
Romer P. (1986) “Increasing returns and long run growth” Journal of Political Econ-
omy 94, 5: 1002-1037. 
 
Romer P. (1990) “Endogenous technological change” Journal of Political Economy 
98: S71-S102. 
 
Solow R.M. (1956) “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics  70: 65–94. 
 
Solow R.M. (1957) “Technical change and the aggregate production function” Review 
of Economics and Statistics 39: 312-320. 
 
Temple, J. (2001) “Generalizations that aren’t? Evidence on education and growth” 
European Economic Review 45: 905-918. 
 
Vandenbussche J., Aghion P.  and Meghier C. (2006) “Growth, distance to frontier 
and composition of human capital” Journal of Economic Growth 11, 2: 97-127. 
 
Wössmann L. (2003) “Specifying human capital” Journal of Economic Surveys 17, 3: 
239-270. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32    FOI    Human capital, technological progress and growth 
Appendix 
Substituting equations (2’), (6) and (10) into equation (9) delivers the following ex-
pression 
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Equation (A1) is an ordinary difference equation of 1st order that depends on one 
variable only. It has the general form . It is not possible to calculate a so-
lution analytically. In stead we use qualitative theory to proof the existence and 
uniqueness of a solution.  
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Since  and  are continuous for n>0 there exists one and only one so-
lution to the difference equation (A1) with an associated integral curve that passes 
through .
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To determine the development of the economy during the transitional period it is 
noted that when there exists a steady state with a constant number of differentiated 
goods then the integral 
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0 
in (A1) may be split up in two integrals. Let  denote the point in time when the 
economy reaches long-run steady state. Before  there is positive growth in n, and 
from time  on the number of differentiated goods is constant. Hence, 
*t
*t
*t
 
6 Sydsæter (1986), p. 21. 
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where  is between and )( ctn + )(tn n , and we have used the generalized mean 
value theorem.7 By substituting this expression into (A1) we can determine the devel-
opment of n during the period : ),0 *t[t ∈
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and n in steady state: 
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Equations A2 an A3 corresponds to equations 11 and 12 in the text 
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7 The generalized mean value theorem states that  where 
. It is valid if  and  are continuous in a ≤≤ . 
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